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Abstract
We study the effect on savings of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) re-
form in the Netherlands. We study savings allocation in a DGS environment and
we empirically investigate how bank accounts allocations of the Dutch house-
holds changed as a response to the reform. Moreover, we highlight the indirect
effect on consumption and stock market investments and the role of peers in
influencing people’s financial decisions. We find evidence of bunching behavior
at the insurance limit. Results indicate a general positive impact on saving
amounts, with heterogenous effects depending on relative peers’ financial soph-
istication: people with unsophisticated peers tend to save more as a response
to the reform, while people with sophisticated peers tend to save more cautiously.
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I - Introduction
The ultimate goal of any Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS hereafter) is to safe-
guard the confidence of small savers. Thanks to a deposit insurance that reimburses
a limited amount of depositors’ savings in case of default, bank runs are prevented,
making bank defaults less likely. Bank runs, i.e. mass withdrawals caused by solvency
concerns, played a prominent role in monetary history, with recurrent episodes since
the early 1900 (Diamond, Dybvig (1983)). In fact, the prevention of bank runs is at
the root of deposit insurance.
For this reason, there is a long-lasting debate on policy interventions aimed at pre-
venting runs: Friedman and Schwartz (1963) suggest that payment restrictions such
as convertibility suspension ensure reasonably small effects of bank panics on banks
balance sheet. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) confirm the result by directly model-
ing bank runs as situations where agents, observing large withdrawals, correctly infer
that the bank is likely to fail and they precipitate to make withdrawals. Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) show that a tax-financed deposit insurance dominates convertib-
ility suspension and lending-of-last-resort as alternative solutions.
Despite the long-lasting debate, we do not have actual evidence of its effectiveness in
preventing bank runs (Iyer, Puri (2012)) and little is known on the effects of deposit
insurance from an empirical point of view. Moreover, the academic and institutional
debate concerning deposit insurance has not developed substantially after the key
contributions of the eighties, due to a substantial fall in the occurrence of bank runs.
However, bank-panics suddenly re-emerged as a source of public concern, after that
a few episodes occurred in the U.S. at the onset of the recent financial crisis (Gertler,
Kiyotaki (2015)). As a result, policy makers intervened by promoting a set of macro-
prudential policies to limit financial risk in-taking, and the DGS precisely falls within
this new stream of rules.
In this paper we empirically investigate the effect of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
introduction. A unique attempt has been proposed by Iyer et al. (2017) that use bank
level data to study its effect on banks’ funding in Denmark, where the reform resulted
in an insurance limit decrease. They find evidence of increasing withdrawals, espe-
cially in non-systemic banks. Here, we focus on the opposite case of the Netherlands,
where the reform substantially increased the former deposit insurance, as it was aimed
at. According to Claessens (2017) macro-prudential policies, by definition, distort in-
dividual behaviors. However, the design of these policies usually starts from generic
concerns, rather than from first principles, and the existing literature1 only focuses
on the aggregate effects of these policies, such as on financial vulnerability (credit
growth, house prices, bank leverage) and the real economy (output). In this paper,
we contribute to the literature by taking a micro perspective, and we investigate the
effects of the DGS on household savings. Using household level data, we investigate
the micro effects of a macro-prudential policy by looking at how the reform shapes
individual incentives. We start from two considerations. First, a Deposit Guarantee
Scheme (DGS) is designed to safeguard the confidence of small savers. Our research
question is whether enlarging public guarantees during crises sustain depositors’ con-
1See Claessens (2017) for an extensive review.
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fidence and, thus, households savings. In other words, we ask whether insurance limit
increases can be used as trust-enforcing devices.
The DGS introduction in the Netherlands, which resulted in an insurance limit in-
crease, provides us a natural experiment to answer this question. However, evaluat-
ing the effects of the DGS reform is particularly challenging because (i) it does not
provide direct monetary transfers and (ii) households’ response can be driven both by
the increasing insurance provided by the DGS and/or by the increasing uncertainty
over the banking sector. This reform was in fact introduced during a period of un-
usual uncertainty for the Dutch banking sector, characterized by banks failures and
rescues. We overcome this issue by exploiting a particular feature of the DGS: the
partial insurance. The intuition is the following: after the reform all deposits below
the DGS 100.000 euro threshold are fully insured, so no reallocation is needed. On
the contrary, deposits above the insurance limit are still partially at risk and can be
reallocated. If perceived riskiness is high, depositors can reallocate their savings and
reduce their uninsured balance. If, instead, the insurance limit increase is an effective
policy device, it would directly affect perceived riskiness, and people may be more
prone to hold uninsured balance accounts, as they know that credible institutions
are providing public guarantees. Our Difference-in-Differences approach enables us to
exclude such competing mechanisms and to conclude that the effect is entirely driven
by the signaling effect of the DGS reform. We show that an increase in the regulatory
limit, by providing additional guarantees, can be an effective trust-enforcing device.
Second, the idea is that when the general public observes large withdrawals, fears
of solvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals (Chari, Jagannathan (1988)),
and theoretical models describe withdrawals as strategic decisions, that agents take
after observing what the others do. The reason is that during bank runs the expected
payoff of a claiming agent depends on its place in line, given the sequential nature
of bank refunds. This suggests that (despite a DGS designed to tackle this) peers
can affect the decision to save, especially during troubled times. Our second research
question is whether peers affect deposit decisions.
To answer this question, a major challenge is the unavailability of information on net-
work links, such as friendships. This information is available in very few surveys since
it is prohibitively expensive to collect. Therefore, peer effects need to be proxied and
researchers usually face two possibilities. One possibility is to proxy peer effects with
neighborhood effects using location information, under the assumption that social
interactions are local. However, also location information is rarely available because
of privacy restrictions. Another possibility is to rely on the results of network studies
and to define a social circle on the basis of a common set of characteristics (such as age
and education). In both cases, the econometrician never observes the true links, and
the resulting proxy can be very poor. To overcome these issues, we take advantage of
the DNB Household Survey (DHS) that contains a set of Aggregated Relational Data
(ARD hereafter), i.e. questions of the form: "How many of your acquaintances have
trait k?" or "Which level of trait k do most of your acquaintances have?".
The clear advantage of using ARD is that it provides a correct summary statistic of
a given social circle’s characteristic. In fact, by letting the respondent self-define his
own social circle, we don’t need to proxy his family and friendship ties and, thus,
their characteristics. In such a way, we solve the issue of measurement error due to
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the misspecification of the proxy variable. A unique attempt in studying peer effects
in deposit decisions is due to Iyer et al (2012). Their study case is a run faced by
a Indian bank in which, to open a deposit account, one needs an introduction from
someone who has already an account opened in the same bank. They show that the
probability of running is increasing in the fraction of people running in the intro-
ducer network, and they show that a deposit insurance partially helps in mitigating
runs. More generally, there is a huge empirical evidence showing that peers can influ-
ence people’s financial decisions such as saving decisions (Duflo, Saez (2012)), stock
market participation decisions (Hong et al. (2004), Brown et al. (2005)), borrowing
decisions (Haliassos et al. (2014)) and the decision to insure (Cai et al. (2015)).
A common explanation is that financial decisions involve complexities that individu-
als have difficulties in understanding, based on their own education, information and
experience (Cai et al. (2015)). Therefore, gathering information is an expensive activ-
ity, and peers carry the most informational content. We contribute to the literature
aimed at capturing the effect of peer characteristics (exogenous peer effects) in finan-
cial decision making. We employ a Triple Difference (TD) estimator that preserves
our identification strategy and allows us to compare the post-reform saving decisions
of people sharing sophisticated and unsophisticated social circles. We proxy peers’
financial sophistication with ARD on peers education and income. It has already
been shown that non financial sophisticated households make severe investment mis-
takes in the stock markets (Calvet et al (2009)). But differently from stocks, that
are held by richer and highly educated people (Haliassos, Bertaut (1995), Guiso et
al. (2003)), almost everybody hold deposits. We show that financial sophistication
makes a difference even for such basic financial instruments and we employ a battery
of robustness checks to exclude competing explanations. Results show that while
people with unsophisticated acquaintances save more as a response to the reform,
people with financially sophisticated peers tend to be more cautious and keep their
savings closer to the insurance limit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II we provide insti-
tutional details about the DGS reform and we discuss the framework that motivates
our empirical study. Section IV discusses data and descriptive evidence. In Section V
we present the empirical analysis on the effect of the reform and on the role of peers.
Section VI concludes.
II - Institutional framework
The Deposit Guarantee Scheme
According to the Financial Stability Forum (2001) the deposit insurance is one
of the key elements of the financial safety-net, along with prudential regulation and
supervision, and a lender of last resort. By the end of 2008 the EU established an
harmonized deposit guarantee scheme able to unify and extend the existing national
guarantee schemes. Under the new EU legislation the DGS is entirely funded by fin-
ancial institutions, in order not to weigh on taxpayers, and it reimburses depositors’
savings up to 100.000 euro, across all EU countries.
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Before this reform, deposits in the Netherlands were covered by a national deposit in-
surance (Depositogarantiestelsel) that reimbursed deposits up to 38.000 euro. There-
fore, depositors gained additional protection on their savings. More precisely, up to
October 2008, deposit insurance in the Netherlands guaranteed a 100% coverage of
the first 20.000 euro and an additional 90% coverage of the next 20.000 euro, with
a total maximum insurance coverage up to 38.000 euro. The DGS covers private
individuals and small businesses and it is limited to bank saving products only. All
insurance products such as life insurances are excluded.
The DGS is a per person, per bank insurance scheme, meaning that in case of bank
failure the 100.000 euro insurance limit has to be applied to the amounts sum of all the
relevant assets within the same bank held by the same account holder. The relevant
assets for the DGS are all payment and saving bank products like payment accounts,
demand and fixed-term deposits as well as all credit balances of credit cards. On the
contrary, life-insurance policies have no insurance protection under the DGS rules.
Wealth allocation under the DGS rules
Suppose an agent is endowed with a liquid amount of wealth at using bank de-
posits as saving device. Banks offer homogeneous saving products, that is they all
offer a deposit contract that gives at time t + 1 a fixed rate of return R = 1 + r for
each unit of saving deposited at time t. Next, suppose that a DGS is in place, so that
deposits are covered by a deposit insurance up to a threshold τ . As a consequence,
for a depositors endowed with at ≤ τ , the evolution of wealth is deterministic and
equal to at+1 = Rat. On the contrary, depositors endowed with a wealth amount
higher than the insurance threshold (at > τ) are subject to bank failure risk and their
(expected) wealth dynamics is as follows:
E(at+1) = Rτ + [piλ+ (1− pi)R(at − τ)] (1)
Where pi is the (subjective) bank’s default probability and λ is a recovery rate. With
probability pi the bank fails and the rate of return on the uninsured balance is the
recovery rate λ ∈ (0, 1). With probability (1− pi) the bank doesn’t fail and the agent
receives the agreed rate of return R = 1 + r. Therefore, the expected future level
of wealth is made up of a safe part equal to Rτ and a risky part that is equal to
[piλ+ (1− pi)R](at − τ).
Next, a particular feature of the DGS is that it is a per person, per bank deposit
insurance, meaning that depositors are insured up to τ in each different bank they
are saving in. Therefore, for an agent endowed with at > τ nothing is lost: he
can open deposit accounts in different banks and keep his wealth fully insured by
saving an amount at most equal to τ in each account opened. However, opening
several deposit accounts is not for free: it typically requires a fixed transaction cost
(service fees, taxes) to be paid, other than a general implicit cost (inconveniences,
such as many passwords, notifications, bank cards renewals etc.) involved by holding
multiple deposits. If the former cost increases linearly with the number of accounts
being held, we think that the latter increases more than proportionally relative to
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the number of accounts. As a result, a depositor endowed with at > τ and n deposit
accounts, leaving part of his wealth unsecured in order to pay less transaction costs,
will have an expected wealth dynamics equal to:
E(at+1) = Rnτ + [piλ+ (1− pi)R(at − nτ)]− c(n) (2)
Where c(n) is a cost function, with c′(n) > 0, and pi is now the subjective probability
of default associated to the bank where the depositor has an uninsured balance, i.e.
an amount greater than τ2. As it can be easily seen, the wealth dynamic has a cost-
benefit structure in which the benefit is represented by the insurance coverage that is
increasing and linear in n. The cost of holding is also increasing in n, possibly more
than proportionally.
As a result we can write the expected wealth dynamics for an agent having n de-
posit accounts as follows:
E(at+1) =
{
Rat − c(n) if at ≤ nτ
Rnτ + [piλ+ (1− pi)R(at − nτ)]− c(n) if at > nτ
(3)
How does (expected) wealth respond to a change in the parameters? Specifically,
what is the response to changes in the insurance limit or in perceived riskiness?
It should be easy to distinguish the two effects, as they have opposite sign, but from
a pure empirical perspective it is difficult to identify them for many reasons. First
of all many parameters, such as the recovery rate or the perceived bank riskiness,
are unobservables. Second, these parameters often change simultaneously: during a
crisis there may be increasing banks’ fragility, but also increasing support from policy
makers who extend public guarantees as a response to the crisis itself. Third, there
may be a direct relation between the two, in fact an increase in the insurance limit
by extending public guarantees sustains depositors confidence, thus directly affecting
perceived riskiness3, and suggesting a relation of the kind pi = f(τ).
For these reasons, to isolate the causal effect of a single determinant out of the other
is a very difficult task. However, from eq. (2) and (3) we see that an increase in τ
or pi only affects a specific subset of depositors. In particular, increases in τ affect
everybody, as one either gains full insurance coverage or a reduction of the uninsured
balance. On the contrary, increases in pi only affect those having uninsured balances,
as people having full insurance coverage do not need to reallocate deposits, since they
are not subject to bank default risk. This last intuition can help us in dealing with
this identification issue, that is addressed in the next section.
Eventually, it is important to stress that changes in the insurance limit or in changes in
households’ perceived riskiness can affect the relative incentive to consume or invest,
other than the direct decision to save. For example, a stochastic consumption-saving
2In fact, in case of multiple accounts holding, each account is fully insured if and only if ωjat ≤ τ
∀j, where ωj is the fraction of wealth deposited in the j−th account. If all deposit accounts are
insured, the overall wealth is fully insured too.
3see Diamond Dybvig (1983) on the discussion of self-fulfilling expectations leading to bank runs
and the role of policy interventions in preventing runs, or Iyer and Puri (2012) on the discussion of
how limit extensions or beliefs on deposit insurance prevent bank runs.
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model would predict that, as returns riskiness increases, people cut current consump-
tion (Hansen, Singleton (1983)). In our empirical investigation, we also take into
account the indirect effect on investment and consumption of a change in the determ-
inants of saving.
III - Data and Descriptive Analysis
Data
For the empirical investigation that follows, we use data from the DNB Household
Survey (DHS). The DHS is a panel data survey representative of the Dutch speaking
population and consists of about 2000 households interviews in every year since 1993.
The DHS contains very detailed information about Dutch households’ assets and
liabilities, as well as psychological and economic aspects of financial behavior and
information about personal characteristics and living conditions. Eventually, DHS
contains information both at the household and the household member level.
A nice feature of the DHS panel survey is that respondents are asked to list every
single deposit account, as well as any other saving and investment product, and to
indicate the corresponding account balance and the financial institution in which the
account is registered. For our empirical application we first obtain information on
household financial assets by aggregating all assets held by all household members.
Then, since the DGS is a per person - per bank deposit insurance, we focus on saving
deposits and we sum up all deposit amounts held by the same account holder in the
same bank, and we reshape the data at the deposit level. After this procedure, we
obtain an unbalanced panel where our statistical unit consists of the deposit amount
held by each household member in each bank, with one observation for every year the
household participates to the survey.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on saving accounts held by Dutch households.
Saving accounts are bank accounts used mainly for saving purposes, in which people
usually deposit considerable amounts. These accounts are distinct from checking
accounts that are used mainly for paying or receiving the salary, and that usually
have very low deposited amounts. For this reason we exclude them from our analysis.
The number of saving deposits that Dutch households hold ranges from one to twenty,
even though the majority of them hold one or two saving accounts, which correspond
to the median values. The table also shows that most deposits are concentred in
the same banks, as the average number of banks is lower than the average number
of accounts. The average deposit amount ranges from about EUR 16.000 in 2007 to
about EUR 24.000 in 2010. The average deposit amount, as well as the maximum,
is quite high and is far above the median value. This is not surprising since Dutch
people often take out saving mortgages, i.e. mortgages in which instead of paying
back the principal, the borrower contribute to a saving deposits.
Figure 1 and 2 show the distribution of deposit amounts before and after the policy
change, in a narrow window around the old and the new insurance limit, respectively.
The vertical line denotes insurance limit. In Figure 1, the considerable deposit mass
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just below EUR 38.000 in panel (a) disappears after the policy change in panel (b):
the corresponding distribution displays more mass for values both lower or greater
than the limit insurance. Possibly, part of the deposits mass below 38.000 euro reflects
strategic allocations (bunching at the insurance limit). This is confirmed in Figure
2, showing the same comparison (the amount distribution before and after the policy
change) around the new insurance limit. A huge mass of deposits around EUR 100.000
emerges, with a density that is two or three times higher than the density in nearby
bins. Moreover, there is no mass in correspondence of deposit amounts just greater
than 100.000 euro. If the evidence was not the clearest in Figure 1, Figure 2 gives
strong descriptive evidence of depositors strategically bunching at the threshold, i.e.
adjusting their allocations in such a way to have full insurance coverage and to hedge
or at least minimize banks’ default risk. This descriptive evidence motivates the
empirical analysis in the proceeding sections.
IV - Empirical Analysis
Identification strategy
In this section we analyze the households’ response to the 2008 DGS reform to
see whether insurance limit increases sustain depositors’ confidence. As anticipated,
the challenge is that their response can be driven both by the increasing insurance
provided by the regulation and by the increasing riskiness that characterizes this crisis
period. We overcome this issue using a difference in differences (DiD) approach in a
deposit level analysis. We base our identification strategy on the framework discussed
in Section II and on the descriptive evidence of Section III: while the DGS reform
provides more insurance protection to everybody, from eq. (3) a change in perceived
riskiness only affects those having uninsured balance accounts. Moreover, from Figure
(2) we see that the insurance limit represents a reference point, as some people do
bunch at the threshold. Therefore we take the insurance limit as a sharp rule to define
the treatment (T) and the control (C) groups of our DiD design. We set as T units all
deposits with an amount greater than the insurance limit threshold: T = 1[at > τ ].
Conversely, the C group consists of deposits with amount equal or below than the
same threshold. Again, after the reform all deposits below the 100.000 euro threshold
are fully insured, so no reallocation is needed. On the contrary, deposits above the
insurance limit are still partially at risk and can be reallocated. Therefore, risk ex-
posure represents the treatment of our quasi-natural experiment: if riskiness increases
depositors should withdraw their uninsured balance; if instead riskiness decreases due
to the larger guarantees, depositors will be more willing to let uninsured amounts on
their saving accounts.
Eventually, we compare T and C outcomes in a sufficiently narrow window of ob-
servations around the insurance limit, in the years before and after reform. As a
result, the resulting estimate will reflect a local effect. The choice of the observation
interval poses a tradeoff: on one hand, by excluding T and C units too far away from
the threshold we would identify the local effect properly, but we would loose estim-
ation precision as the number of observations falls. On the other hand, by taking
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a wide interval we would increase sample size and thus estimation accuracy, but we
would include observations that, being too far away from the insurance limit, may
not respond to its change. According to this tradeoff we select the (20.000− 300.000)
interval. Also, we select a four year window around the reform, from 2007 to 2010.
We consider the following linear model for DiD:
yi,t = α+ β0 Ti,t +
T∑
t=1
βt 1[t ≥ τ ] +
T∑
t=1
βATTt
(
Ti × 1[t ≥ τ ]
)
+ i,t (4)
Where 1[A] is an indicator function taking value one when event A occurs, τ is the
reform year and T is the treatment group identifier. In this linear model for DiD we
allow for multiple time periods so that the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) is captured by the coefficients βATTt = E(yτ+t(1)− yτ+t(0)|T = 1) ∀t. Given
our empirical application, we can conveniently re-write the model as follows:
ihs(dep)i,j,t = α+ β0 Abovei,j,t + β
′
tAftert + β
ATT ′
t di,j,t + γ
′Xj,t + ci + i,j,t (5)
The dependent variable is the deposit amount held in bank i by household j at
time t and ihs(−) denotes its inverse-hyperbolic sine transformation (Burbidge et al.
(1988)). Aftert = [2009, 2010] is a vector of post-reform years dummies, Abovei,j,t
identifies all deposits above the insurance threshold and di,j,t are the interaction terms
between the treatment indicator and each of the post-reform years.
The coefficients β′t represent the pure before-after effect, as they capture the effect of
the additional guarantees given to everybody after the DGS reform, while the ATT is
identified by the coefficients βATT
′
t that capture the effect of the reform on perceived
riskiness (what we call the signaling effect), which is limited to those still having
uninsured balance accounts after the DGS reform. Eventually, Xj,t are household
level covariates and ci are unobserved common factors at the deposit level. Note that
because of our observation window selection, it is unlikely that a household has more
than one eligible account. Therefore, ci is a common factor at household level. For
a few cases, when there is more than one eligible accounts, ci is a common factor at
the deposit level and we control for the correlation among accounts held by the same
holder by clustering the residuals at the household level.
The selected covariates are: household income, the outstanding total debt towards
the bank where the deposit is registered, a dummy variable indicating whether this
year expenses are going to be unusually high and a set of demographics4. Moreover,
following Iyer and Puri (2012) we account for bank’s cross selling with a variable
ranging from 1 to 6 indicating the number of different contract types held with the
same bank, including deposit and checking accounts, mortgages and personal loans,
deposit books and saving certificates5. In fact, the higher is the number of contracts
with a customer, the higher is the amount of soft information that the bank obtains,
and the higher will be the opportunity cost of changing the bank, since it is unlikely
4We control for a quadratic in age and for the employment status dummies. All other time
invariant controls (bank FE, education, household composition etc.) are captured by the unit fixed
effect.
5Iyer and Puri (2012) can only use the loan link indicator as a proxy for the depth of bank-client
relationship (cross selling), i.e. whether the depositor has a loan with the same bank.
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for the customer to find the same economic conditions in other banks. For this reason,
they claim that cross selling represents a complementary insurance against the risk
of having a run. The next section discusses the estimation results.
The general effect of the reform
We estimate the effect of the DGS on savings amounts using the linear model for
DiD in eq. (5). We estimate it using FE to account for all unobservable factors such
as financial literacy and risk aversion, that may bias the estimate through their correl-
ation with one or more covariates (for example Above) and hence cause inconsistency
of the estimates. Results are reported in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at
household level. Specification (a) is without controls, in (b) we control for demo-
graphics and in (c) we also add our set of covariates. Table 2 shows a positive effect
on saving amounts of the DGS reform: deposits above the threshold significantly in-
crease in 2009, just few months after the reform took place.
The average treatment effect (ATT), as captured by the coefficient of above×2009, is
positive and statistically significant and its magnitude indicates that in 2009 the aver-
age deposit amount above the insurance limit increased on average by EUR 11.720,00
relative to the pre-reform trend6. Moreover, the magnitude and the significance of
the ATT is robust across all three specifications.
Results from Table 2 indicate that insurance limit changes can be effective policy
tools to boost depositors’ confidence: after the reform, people with deposits above
the insurance limit increased their saving amounts (and hence their uninsured bal-
ances) despite the high uncertainty characterizing the banking sector in this period.
This is because the DGS reform provides explicit as well as implicit guarantees on
the willingness of policy makers to avoid bank crises, bank runs and depositors losses.
Based on this evidence we conclude that the DGS reform triggered a confidence boost.
Figure 3 (a) provides a graphical representation of the result in Table 2, showing the
average saving amounts above and below the threshold, in each of the sample years.
It shows that the trends in the two groups are parallel in the pre-reform period, while
between 2008 and 2009 (as the reform is introduced) the average amount in treated
deposits increases sharply relative to the average amount in the control group, which
remains stable. Then, the two trends return parallel.
Peer effects in saving decisions
In this section we investigate whether peers affect the decision to save in periods of
high uncertainty. From the previous section we know that after the reform those who
still had uninsured balance accounts increased, on average, their savings as a result
of additional public guarantees. However the descriptive evidence of Figures 1 and 2
suggests something more going on: after the policy change there have been episodes
of strategic reallocation, with some depositors bunching at the threshold to maximize
6See the Appendix for the estimation of the ATT magnitude.
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insurance coverage. This strategic behavior also seems to "come from above", i.e.
seems to be due to reallocations and withdrawals on accounts above EUR 100.000.
To further investigate on this, the more straightforward way to proceed is to look
more in detail at the T group. Here, we extend our previous analysis and we em-
ploy a Triple Differences (TD) estimator that enables us to investigate heterogeneous
effects, i.e. within group differences in the response to the DGS reform, while pre-
serving our identification strategy. In fact according to Lee (2005), once the parallel
trend assumption holds, the corresponding assumption for TD7 is likely to hold too.
More precisely, within the group of depositors with uninsured balance accounts after
the reform, the TD compares the responses to the reform of those sharing financially
sophisticated and unsophisticated social circles to investigate peer effects in saving
decisions.
We proxy peers’ financial sophistication with peers’ income and education. Precisely,
we define the degree of peers’ financial sophistication as the level of income and educa-
tion that most people in each respondent’s social circle have, by using the correspond-
ing set of Aggregated Relational Data (ARD). Then, we build a binary indicator that
measures peers’ financial sophistication on a relative basis, and we define respondents
having sophisticated friends as those having friends that are more educated and richer
than they are8. The possible channel from peers financial sophistication to individual
saving decisions is the following: gathering information on bank fundamentals is a dif-
ficult and expensive task, therefore people can take advice from sophisticated peers,
who carry the most informational content9.
Let Gj = {0, 1} be the qualified group indicator taking value one for households hav-
ing sophisticated acquaintances inside their social circle. The TD estimator identifies
the following statistic:
TD = E
(
yτ+t(1)− yτ+t(0)|X,G = 1, T = 1
) ∀t
The TD estimator identifies the average treatment effect on the subgroup G of the
treatment group T . In our specific case, it identifies the impact of the DGS reform
on the subgroup of respondents having uninsured balance accounts (T = 1) and fin-
ancially sophisticated friends (G = 1).
Results of a linear model for TD are reported in Table 3. A graphical representation
of the result is given in Figure 3 (b). Again, all estimates are FE. The coefficient of
Above×2009 is statistically significant, while the coefficient of soph.peers×Above×2009
is not. Also, the coefficient of soph.peers×Above×2010 is negative and statistically
significant, and compensates the coefficient of Above×2010. This means that, relat-
ively to treated individuals without sophisticated peers, the change in deposit amounts
after the reform for treated individuals with sophisticated friends is equal to -13.000
7It requires the difference between the T and C time effects to be the same for both G subgroups.
In formulas, the difference [E(yt+1(0) − yt(0)|G = 1, T = 1) − E(yt+1(0) − yt(0)|G = 1, T = 0)]
should be equal to {E(yt+1(0) − yt(0)|G = 0, T = 1) − E(yt+1(0) − yt(0)|G = 0, T = 0)}. The
identifying assumption of TD is thus weaker than the corresponding assumption for DiD, as it does
not require the two terms in [−] and {−} to be jointly zero, but it only requires them to be equal.
8We also control for own financial sophistication, namely own income and education.
9This channel of influence is the most relevant in the literature on peer effects in financial decisions,
and it is similar to the one investigated by Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004).
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euro in 2009 and -36.000,00 euro in 201010. In words, this result shows that among
those having uninsured balance accounts (treated depositors), respondents without
sophisticated peers save more after the reform, while respondents with sophisticated
peers tend to stay more cautious: they don’t increase their uninsured balances in
a period of unusual uncertainty and they keep their deposit amounts closer to the
insurance limit. This result points toward the evidence of bunching found in the de-
scriptive analysis.
Figure 3 (b) reports a graphical representation of the result. Before the reform re-
spondents with (dashed lines) and without (solid line) sophisticated peers share the
same trends, while after the reform the increase in savings is entirely driven by the
latter, as treated depositors with sophisticated peers keep following their pre-reform
trend. In this period the Dutch banking sector was characterized by unusual uncer-
tainty, with banks rescues (Fortis) and failures (DSB bank, Icesave). In particular,
the DSB default11 caused a severe confidence drop, despite the recent upward trend
(DNB Annual report, 2009). Our interpretation is that financially sophisticated in-
dividuals may have realized that bank bailouts cannot be given for granted. In fact,
being highly educated and with high income, they are likely to be better informed
and also to have a higher stake at risk, as they may hold uninsured balance accounts
too. As a result, they keep saving more cautiously and don’t increase their deposits
during risky periods. Also, the result possibly reflects information sharing inside the
social circle, as we have regressed an individual outcome (deposits) on a group-level
characteristic (income and education), where the latter represents a widely used proxy
of financial sophistication and awareness used in the Household Finance literature.
The indirect effect of the DGS reform
Generally speaking, results from previous sections show that the DGS reform,
which resulted in a insurance limit increase, had on average a positive (but hetero-
genous) effect on household savings. In fact, by providing additional guarantees, the
DGS reform affects the decision the save. However, the decision to save and the
decision to consume or invest are considered as simultaneous. In this section we in-
vestigate the indirect effects on consumption and stock market investments of the
DGS reform. In other words, we ask whether the increase in saving came at the cost
of investment or consumption. To answer the questions, we move from a deposit level
analysis to a household level analysis and we set as treated units the households having
at least one uninsured deposit account, in order to have a one-to-one correspondence
with the deposit level analysis. Conversely, we set as C units all households with no
uninsured balances. Again, to be consistent with the previous analysis, we exclude
families having all that deposits outside the EUR 20.000-300.000 interval. We repeat
10See the Appendix for the estimation of the ATT magnitude.
11DSB bank (Dirk Scheringa Beheer) was a relatively small Dutch bank whose main activity was
the provision of mortgages. It went bankrupt on October 1, 2009 after that the representative of
unsatisfied DSB-customers, Mr. Pieter Lakeman, motivated depositors at the DSB bank to withdraw
their money. The Dutch National Bank let DSB fail and activated the new Deposit Guarantee
Scheme. This conduct was in sharp contrast with the recent past, as written in the report, "to
discourage unduly risk conduct, the collapse of a bank can and must never be ruled out".
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our TD estimation using consumption and investment as dependent variable. The
latter is a continuous variable of household total financial wealth, that excludes all
DGS relevant assets as well as business equity. The former is a binary indicator taking
value one when the household is planning to do big expenses in durable consumption
during the year. Note that since the durable consumption variable is binary, we use a
linear probability model in the consumption specification, as nonlinear models such as
Logit and Probit give inconsistent estimates of the marginal effect of the interaction
term (Ai, Norton (2003)), that in our specification captures the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATT).
Results are reported in Table 4. Columns (a) and (b) refer to financial wealth, while
(c) and (d) refer to durable consumption. Table 4 shows a nonsignificant indirect
effect on investments in financial wealth (FW) in both groups of treated: a small
level of significance of soph.peers×Above×2009 emerges, but suddenly vanishes as we
control for our set of covariates in specification (c). On the other hand, we do find a
significant indirect effect on expenses in durable consumption (DC): the coefficient of
above×2009 is negative and significant, and compensates the coefficient of soph.peers×
above×2009. Note that since we use a linear probability model for this specification,
the coefficients represent conditional probabilities of making big expenses in durable
consumption. In summary, we find that people sharing a mostly unsophisticated so-
cial circle save more after the DGS reform, and that the increase in saving amounts
above the insurance limit came at the cost of consumption. Durable consumption is
in fact easier to postpone than consumption for primary goods. This result possibly
reflect precautionary motives: in times of uncertainty, they cut consumption and in-
crease savings. Conversely, the increase in savings cannot be explained with portfolio
reallocations from risky to (relatively) safe assets. People with sophisticated peers,
instead, keep saving more cautiously after the DGS reform and, correspondingly, their
consumption and stock investment paths keep following the pre-reform trends.
Internal validity and robustness
Our identification strategy relies on three main assumptions. First, we employ
Difference-in-differences and Triple-differences to identify the treatment effect on the
treated under the assumption that, in absence of the treatment, the T and C groups
would follow parallel trends. Second, in our design we assign deposits to treatment
and control group on the basis of risk exposure, i.e. whether depositors have unin-
sured balances (deposits above EUR 100.000) after the reform. Third, we claim that
the effect is local and the results in Table 2 are estimated using a specific window of
observations around the new insurance limit of EUR 100.000.
To test the validity of the common trend assumption, we exploit the panel feature of
our data and we use the four years period prior to the reform to repeat specification
(c) of Table 2. Correspondingly, we pretend the reform year to be the second, 2006.
Results are reported in Figure 4: over the period 2005-2008 the T group (red solid
line) and the C group (blue dashed line) shared the same untreated response, since
the two lines are perfectly parallel. This provides further evidence of the plausibility
of the common trend assumption and of the validity of our identification strategy.
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Second, in our design we assign deposits below EUR 100.000 to the control group,
since they are subject to full insurance coverage. Conversely, deposits above EUR
100.000 are assigned to the treatment group, as they are still at risk and can possibly
be reallocated. As a consequence, after the reform the dynamics of the latter should
reflect perceived risk, other than household specific needs of consumption and saving.
To validate our design, we follow our line of reasoning and we perform the following
Placebo test: we set as (placebo) treatment group all deposits below 38.000 euro.
These deposits are subject to full insurance coverage before and after the DGS re-
form, so the reform didn’t affect them as they have been never exposed to default risk.
Then, we repeat the same DiD specification of Table 2, using now as treatment the
group that is known not to be affected by the policy (Placebo treatment). Results are
reported in Table 512: across all specifications neither the coefficient of below × 2009
nor the coefficient of below × 2010 are statistically significant. A small level of signi-
ficance emerges in 2010 only, but the effect suddenly vanishes as we control for our
set of covariates. Again, this result seems to validate our empirical design.
Eventually, we investigate whether results are driven by a specific selection of the
observations window. On the one hand by taking tighter intervals we carefully target
the local effect, but on the other hand estimation precision falls because of the loss in
the number of observations, especially in the left tail of the deposit distribution. The
interval chosen for the baseline regressions was the (20.000-300.000) window. Here
we check whether our baseline results of Table 2 change as the observations window
changes. The results obtained using specification (c) of Table 2 are reported in Table
6 and show that as we further restrict the observation interval, the ATT remain ro-
bust and stable across all different selections.
Taken as a whole, these robustness checks allow us to conclude that the identification
strategy seems to be valid since (i) the estimates are able to detect the true null
hypothesis of no treatment effect when the given treatment is placebo and (ii) the
estimates are not driven by specific window selections.
V - Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an evaluation of the effects of the DGS introduction in the
Netherlands. We focused on both the direct effect on households’ savings and on
the indirect effects on consumption and stock market investment. The DGS was in-
troduced during a period of unusual uncertainty to sustain depositors’ confidence,
and resulted in a insurance limit increase that provided additional guarantees to de-
positors’ savings. We observe bunching behavior at the (new) insurance limit, that
distinguishes insured deposits from (partially) uninsured ones in the distribution of
savings. Using Difference-in-Differences and Triple-Differences we compare insured
and unbalance deposit accounts to disentangle the effect of larger public guarantees
on perceived riskiness, and we find significant effects of the DGS reform on saving
12Since we set all deposits below 38.000 as (placebo) T group, differently from our baseline specific-
ations, we also consider all deposits below 20.000 euro in the estimate, in order to preserve balance
across the T and C group. For such a reason, the number of observations is now higher than before.
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amounts: results show an average increase of (uninsured) saving amounts by EUR
11.700 relative to the pre-reform trend, suggesting that insurance limit increases are
effective policy tools in boosting depositors’ confidence. Importantly, results show
households’ response heterogeneity to the DGS reform: treated depositors in unsoph-
isticated social circles start saving more and that the increase in savings come at
the cost of consumption, i.e. they postpone the purchase of durable goods. On the
contrary, respondents with sophisticated peers save more cautiously: they don’t in-
crease their uninsured balances in risky times for the banking sector (characterized
by failures and rescues). The Triple Difference estimate indicates a difference up to
EUR -36.500 among the two groups of treated households. This result highlights the
role of peers in influencing people’s financial decisions even for the simplest financial
instruments such as saving deposits. Also, the result contributes to the empirical lit-
erature on peer effects in financial decisions, and partially supports theoretical models
in which the decision to deposit and withdraw is strategic, and explicitly depends on
the decision of others. Eventually, the possible channel from peers’ sophistication to
individual savings decisions is information sharing within the social circle.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
2007 2008 2009 2010
Deposit amount
mean 16.717,88 16.946,81 18.865,74 24.338,34
median 5.597,00 6.674,00 7.966,50 9.000,00
max 556.586,00 650.759,00 850.000,00 500.000,00
N. of accounts
mean 1.16 1.24 1.32 1.34
median 1 1 2 2
max 15 20 20 17
N. of banks
mean 1.15 1.17 1.23 1.25
median 1 1 1 1
max 4 4 4 5
Note: Descriptive statistics at household level. The top Panel the mean, the median and the max-
imum amount deposited in a saving account by the Dutch households in each year. The middle panel
reports the mean, the median and the maximum number of saving accounts that Dutch households
hold in each year. The bottom panel reports the mean, the median and the maximum number of
different banks in which Dutch households hold saving accounts, for each year.
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Table 2: The general effect of the DGS reform
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE FE
above 0.489*** 0.486*** 0.444***
(0.0936) (0.0950) (0.1201)
2009 0.031 -0.032 -0.023
(0.0354) (0.0461) (0.0483)
2010 0.167** 0.085 0.128
(0.0844) (0.0979) (0.0984)
above×2009 0.237* 0.248* 0.311**
(0.1233) (0.1264) (0.1420)
above×2010 0.451 0.455* 0.454
(0.2991) (0.2739) (0.2888)
household income -0.002**
(0.0012)
outstanding bank debt 0.001
(0.0008)
high future expenses 0.041
(0.0569)
cross selling 0.152
(0.0992)
controls NO YES YES
R-squared 0.221 0.235 0.261
N obs. 1134 1122 1023
N households 517 509 452
N deposits 836 825 744
Note: The dependent variable is the amount deposited in the saving account i, by household j at
time t, in its inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) transformation. All estimates are Fixed-Effects Difference-
in-differences. Standard errors are clustered at household level. The set of covariates include the
net annual household income, the outstanding debt towards the same bank where the account is
registered, a dummy equal to one when the household head expects high household expenses over
the year, and a variable equal to the number of different contract types the household has in the
bank. The set of controls include age, its square, and a set of employment status dummies. The
symbols *, **, and *** denote ten, five and one percent statistical significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Peer effects in saving decisions
(a) (b) (c)
above 0.485*** 0.485*** 0.410***
(0.1145) (0.1024) (0.1371)
2009 0.102* 0.032 0.040
(0.0612) (0.0723) (0.0715)
2010 0.306** 0.228 0.275*
(0.1279) (0.1494) (0.1511)
soph.peers 0.082* 0.061 0.036
(0.0442) (0.0465) (0.0495)
above×2009 0.442** 0.461** 0.550**
(0.1973) (0.1890) (0.2196)
above×2010 1.080*** 1.019*** 1.070***
(0.1846) (0.1932) (0.2028)
soph.peers×above -0.074 -0.061 -0.014
(0.1256) (0.1198) (0.1349)
soph.peers×2009 -0.104 -0.094 -0.098
(0.0758) (0.0766) (0.0736)
soph.peers×2010 -0.217 -0.232 -0.246
(0.1644) (0.1701) (0.1674)
soph.peers×above×2009 -0.263 -0.285 -0.327
(0.2315) (0.2235) (0.2348)
soph.peers×above×2010 -0.856*** -0.778*** -0.854***
(0.2339) (0.2559) (0.2551)
controls NO YES YES
R-squared 0.255 0.265 0.292
N obs. 1134 1122 1023
N households 517 509 452
N deposits 836 825 744
Note: The dependent variable is the amount deposited in the saving account i, by household j at
time t, in its inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) transformation. All estimates are Fixed-Effects Triple-
differences. Standard errors are clustered at household level. The set of covariates include the
net annual household income, the outstanding debt towards the same bank where the account is
registered, a dummy equal to one when the household head expects high household expenses over
the year, and a variable equal to the number of different contract types the household has in the
bank. The set of controls include age, its square, and a set of employment status dummies. The
symbols *, **, and *** denote ten, five and one percent statistical significance levels, respectively.
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Table 4: The indirect effect on Financial Wealth and Durable Consumption
(b) (c) (b) (c)
FW FW DC DC
Above -23.977 -24.999 0.261 0.299*
(39.1677) (38.7063) (0.1599) (0.1588)
2009 -10.228 -8.301 0.100 0.132
(15.2737) (15.9815) (0.1068) (0.1149)
2010 -17.602 -18.436 0.069 0.076
(25.7827) (27.3809) (0.1975) (0.2161)
soph.peers -3.332 -3.061 0.010 0.018
(5.2716) (5.9032) (0.0511) (0.0522)
Above×2009 -5.333 -6.781 -0.568*** -0.611***
(28.2076) (27.5916) (0.1774) (0.1833)
Above×2010 8.044 7.595 -0.257 -0.185
(46.6688) (47.7471) (0.2469) (0.2996)
soph.peers×Above 157.889 156.156 -0.157 -0.199
(110.0524) (109.5150) (0.1989) (0.1934)
soph.peers×2009 -5.403 -7.645 -0.126 -0.155
(11.0745) (11.9307) (0.1097) (0.1181)
soph.peers×2010 -8.409 -9.620 0.118 0.133
(21.7221) (24.0060) (0.1928) (0.2120)
soph.peers×Above×2009 -253.731* -254.390 0.464** 0.531**
(153.7923) (154.5367) (0.2166) (0.2221)
soph.peers×Above×2010 -291.327 -287.191 0.127 0.051
(187.2081) (193.2369) (0.2751) (0.3163)
controls YES YES YES YES
covariates NO YES NO YES
R-squared 0.203 0.204 0.050 0.067
N obs. 965 917 911 874
N households 509 484 470 452
Note: In the first two columns, the dependent variable is the household total financial wealth,
excluding DGS-relevant items (saving and checking accounts, deposit books, saving certificates) and
business equity. In the last two columns, the dependent variable is a binary indicator taking value
one if the household plans to do expenses in durable consumption during the year. All estimates are
Fixed-Effects Triple-differences at household level. The Table reports the coefficients associated with
the ATT of interest. The set of covariates include the net annual household income, the outstanding
debt towards the same bank where the account is registered, a dummy equal to one when the
household head expects high household expenses over the year, and a variable equal to the number
of different contract types the household has in the bank. The set of controls include age, its square,
and a set of employment status dummies. The symbols *, **, and *** denote ten, five and one
percent statistical significance levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3)
below -1.535*** -1.513*** -1.551***
(0.1532) (0.1484) (0.1640)
2009 0.067 0.170 0.262**
(0.0969) (0.1081) (0.1172)
2010 0.194 0.381** 0.495**
(0.1385) (0.1891) (0.1947)
below×2009 0.012 0.007 -0.044
(0.1166) (0.1202) (0.1246)
below×2010 -0.407 -0.459* -0.241
(0.2581) (0.2357) (0.1999)
controls NO YES YES
covariates NO NO YES
N obs. 4820 4719 4094
Note: The dependent variable is the amount deposited in the saving account i, by household j at
time t, in its inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) transformation. All estimates are Fixed-Effects Difference-
in-differences. Standard errors are clustered at household level. The Table reports the coefficients
associated with the ATT of interest. below denotes the Placebo Treatment. The symbols *, **, and
*** denote ten, five and one percent statistical significance levels, respectively.
Table 6: Observations window robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
amounts window (’000) 18-350 20-280 20-320 22-280 25-250
above 0.502*** 0.468*** 0.444*** 0.458*** 0.453***
(0.1311) (0.1255) (0.1201) (0.1155) (0.1169)
2009 -0.088* -0.032 -0.023 0.046 0.064
(0.0503) (0.0481) (0.0483) (0.0512) (0.0476)
2010 0.086 0.110 0.128 0.141 0.147
(0.0923) (0.0988) (0.0984) (0.1114) (0.1032)
above×2009 0.467** 0.303** 0.311** 0.268* 0.266*
(0.1830) (0.1439) (0.1420) (0.1362) (0.1373)
above×2010 0.592* 0.623* 0.454 0.481* 0.492*
(0.3252) (0.3185) (0.2888) (0.2891) (0.2777)
controls YES YES YES YES YES
covariates YES YES YES YES YES
N obs. 1022 1028 931 817 1141
Note: The dependent variable is the amount deposited in the saving account i, by household j at
time t, in its inverse hyperbolic sine (ihs) transformation. All estimates are Fixed-Effects Difference-
in-differences. Standard errors are clustered at household level. The Table reports the coefficients
associated with the ATT of interest. Each column reports a different observation window selection,
from the most wide to the most narrow. The symbols *, **, and *** denote ten, five and one percent
statistical significance levels, respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Empirical distribution of deposits around 38.000 euro
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Empirical distribution of deposits around 100.000 euro
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Deposit amounts, treatment status and qualified subgroups
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Figure 4: Parallel trend graphical test
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Appendix: ATT magnitudes
Table 7: ATT from DiD
2008 2009 2010 δ1 δ2
above 152.490,4 164.420,0 166.679,4 11.929,6 14.189
(14.792,6) (14.186,2)
below 39.552,1 39.762,6 42.194,5 210,5 2.642,4
(1.701,9) (1.697,1)
(ATT) 11.720*** 11.547***
(930,1) (802,5)
Note: The Table reports estimated magnitudes of the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATT). The top panel reports conditional group means, and δ1, δ2 represent the 2009 and 2010 within
group changes with respect to the pre-reform year. The bottom panel reports the estimated ATT.
The symbols *, ** and *** denote conventional significance levels.
Table 8: ATT from TD
G = 1 2008 2009 2010 δ1 δ2
above 173.353,5 175.752,7 176.428,4 2.390,2 3.074,9
(19.457,4) (20.453,6)
below 39.711,0 38.896,8 42.823,0 -814,2 3.112,0
(2.145,3) (2.186,0)
DiD1 3.429** -38,9
(1.523,6) (1.448,0)
G = 0 2008 2009 2010 δ1 δ2
above 119.705,7 138.921,3 159.044,6 19.216 39.339
(12.949,1) (16.776,5)
below 39.232,6 41.763,0 42.157,0 2.530,4 2.924,4
(2.805,7) (2.671,2)
DiD2 16.685*** 36.414***
(1.549,3) (1.568,2)
(ATT) -13.256*** -36.452,9***
(650,3) (471,0)
Note: The Table reports estimated magnitudes of the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATT). The top panel reports conditional group means, δ1, δ2 represent the 2009 and 2010 within
group changes with respect to the pre-reform year and DiD1, DiD2 represent the 2009 and 2010
within group DiD. The bottom panel reports the estimated ATT. The symbols *, ** and *** denote
conventional significance levels.
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